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Cooperation: Applications to SDMM and PIR
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Abstract—This work considers the problem of privately out-
sourcing the computation of a matrix product over a finite field Fq
to N helper servers. These servers are considered to be honest but
curious, i.e., they behave according to the protocol but will try to
deduce information about the user’s data. Furthermore, any set
of up to X servers is allowed to share their data. Previous works
considered this collusion a hindrance and the download cost of
the schemes increases with growing X . We propose to utilize
such linkage between servers to the user’s advantage by allowing
servers to cooperate in the computational task. This leads to a
significant gain in the download cost for the proposed schemes.
The gain naturally comes at the cost of increased communication
load between the servers. Hence, the proposed cooperative scheme
can be understood as outsourcing both computational cost and
communication cost.
While the present work exemplifies the proposed server
cooperation in the case of a specific secure distributed matrix
multiplication (SDMM) scheme, the same idea applies to many
other use cases as well. For instance, other SDMM schemes as
well as linear private information retrieval (PIR) as a special
case of SDMM are instantly covered.
Index Terms—Secret Sharing, Secure Distributed Matrix Mul-
tiplication (SDMM), Cooperative SDMM, Private Information
Retrieval (PIR), Distributed Data Storage.
I. INTRODUCTION
Matrix multiplication is one of the key operations in many
science and engineering fields, such as machine learning and
cloud computing. Carrying out the computation on powerful
distributed servers is desirable for improving efficiency, as
the user can partition the computational task into several
sub-tasks and outsource them to many servers. By scaling
out computations across many distributed servers, security
concerns arise. This raises the problem of secure distributed
matrix multiplication (SDMM), which has recently received a
lot of attention from an information-theoretic perspective, both
in terms of code constructions and capacity bounds [1]–[11].
However, The general capacity of SDMM is still largely an
open problem. Private information retrieval (PIR) — another
problem currently getting a lot of attention — can be seen as
a special case of SDMM in the typical case of the responses
being linear functions [12]–[27]. Indeed, a connection between
a variant of SDMM and a form of PIR was drawn in [6], where
an upper bound of the capacity of a special form of SDMM
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was characterized by that of PIR. Later in [28], the problem
of SDMM was converted into a PIR problem.
Consider the foundational problem in which the user has
two matrices A ∈ Ft×sq and B ∈ F
s×r
q over a finite field
of q elements and wishes to compute their product with the
assistance of N servers, which are honest but curious in that
any X of them may collude to deduce information about A or
B. To divide the task into smaller sub-tasks, matrix partition is
a common technique. For example, in [29], the user partitions
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To outsource the sub-tasks and secure the matri-
ces A and B, the user introduces X random ma-
trices Z0, Z1, . . . , ZX−1 to mask A0, A1, . . . , Am−1 and
another X random matrices S0, S1, . . . , SX−1 to mask
B0, B1, . . . , Bn−1. The user then generates N linear
combinations of A0, A1, . . . , Am−1, Z0, Z1, . . . , ZX−1 (resp.
B0, B1, . . . , Bn−1, S0, S1, . . . , SX−1) based on some coding
technique such that any X servers can learn nothing about
A (resp. B), and sends them to the N servers. In [8], the



















and then evaluating them at some distinct points ai ∈ Fq for
i = 0, . . . , N − 1. The exponents αi, βj , and the evaluation
points should be designed such that every X-subset of the
evaluations reveals no information of neither A nor B. The
user then sends f(ai), g(ai) to server i, who computes
h(ai) = f(ai)g(ai) and returns the result to the user. The user
then decodes AkBl, k ∈ [0,m), l ∈ [0, n) from the answers
returned by the fastest Rc servers.
Generally, three performance metrics are of particular in-
terest when designing an SDMM scheme (and more generally
for any matrix multiplication schemes).
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• The upload cost: the amount of data transmitted from the
user to the servers to assign the sub-tasks;
• The download cost: the amount of data to be downloaded
from the servers;
• Recovery threshold Rc: the minimal number of servers
that need to complete their tasks before the user can
recover the desired matrix product.
The upload cost can be essentially determined once the matrix
partition method is chosen and the number of servers is given.
A. Related Work
Besides the ones in [29] and [8], there are other matrix
partition techniques and coding techniques. In [1], [3], [30],
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where m|t, p|s, and n|r, which subsume the one in [29] and
[3] as special cases. While in [6], [11], [31], the so-called
cross subspace alignment codes are employed to outsource
the subtasks.
In [6], the problem of SDMM was generalized to the case
that there are two matrix batches A(0), A(1), . . . , A(L−1) and
B(0), B(1), . . . , B(L−1), where it is assumed that the matrices
are mainly stored across the servers while the user may or may
not have some side information related to the matrices. The
user wishes to obtain the products A(i)B(i) for all i ∈ [0, L)
with the assistance of N distributed servers. This problem
variant is termed secure distributed batch matrix multiplication
(SDBMM).
As a connection to PIR, in the case of L = 1, we can
assume that the matrix B is stored across the servers, while
the user has a private matrix A. In this case, one can regard the
matrix B as a collection of s messages, each of length r, i.e.,
a row of B denotes a message. If A is some row of the s× s
identity matrix, then computing AB is equivalent to retrieve
one message from the database. Therefore, any such SDMM
scheme yields an X-private PIR scheme (where X servers
can collude to deduce the message identity) by treating the
encoded shares of A as the queries sent from the user to the
servers, and the encoded shares of B as data stored across
the servers [6]. For a general matrix A, computing AB is
equivalent to retrieve t linear combinations of the s messages,
which can be regarded as a generalization of X-private PIR
and a kind of private computation [32].
Existing SDMM codes are more or less based on various
matrix partitioning and coding techniques used in [1], [3],
[29], [30] and abundant tradeoffs among the aforementioned
performance metrics have been derived. In [2], Chang and
Tandon proposed constructions of SDMM codes and addressed
the capacity in the case of only one of the matrices A, B is
required to be X-secure. Yang and Lee [4] proposed SDMM
codes in the case of X = 1. Kakar et al. [5] and D’Oliveira et
al. [7], [8] further provided more efficient constructions over
that of Chang and Tandon. Based on the matrix partitioning
technique in [3], [30], Aliasgari et al. [10] presented more
general SDMM codes. Yu et al. recently proposed an SDMM
scheme based on the Entangled Polynomial code in [30] and
the bilinear complexity [33] for multiplying two matrices.
Very recently, another form of server cooperative SDMM has
also been studied but in the context of secure multi-party
computation in [31], [34]. This model contains three parties:
the source nodes, the server nodes (helpers), and a master
node (the user). The data matrices are outsourced by the source
nodes, and the aim is to prevent the master node from learning
anything about the inputs besides the result of the computation.
This is achieved by employing secure multi-party computation,
where server cooperation is used as a key ingredient but it does
not help in reducing the download cost. The problem settings
in [31], [34] and the one in this paper are quite different, thus
it is not meaningful to compare these schemes even though
server cooperation is employed in some form in all of them.
B. Motivation and Contributions
An interesting observation is that in the case of any X
servers colluding to deduce information about either A or B
by sharing their data, previous work considered this collusion
a hindrance and the download cost of the schemes increase
with growing X . It seems that, to date, no one has considered
that such server connectivity could be utilized to the user’s
advantage. For example, in the presence of connectivity or
bandwidth constraints, the server–user and server–server com-
munication costs differ depending on their mutual proximity.
This has been assumed and widely studied in erasure coding
for clustered architectures and its variations [35]–[40], where it
is assumed that the servers are organized into several clusters,
and communication within the clusters is free or much cheaper
than that between different clusters. In this paper, we adopt
this idea to the SDMM problem, and assume that the servers
and the user have such an architecture that the communication
between the helper servers is very cheap so that it can be
neglected. This assumption is of course not always valid, in
which case the increased inter-server communication should
be accounted for. Outsourcing the computation to servers also
helps in avoiding network congestion between the servers and
the user.
In this paper, we propose to use a possible link between
servers to the user’s advantage by allowing servers to coop-
erate in the computational task. This leads to a significant
reduction in the download cost for the proposed scheme,
and helps to avoid network congestion between the servers
and the user. The reduced download cost does not come for
free, but the price is paid by the servers, i.e., is achieved by
offloading the communication between servers and the user to
the communication between servers.
In more detail, the contributions of this paper can be
summarized as:
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• To the best of our knowledge, it is the first time to con-
sider the case that the (download) communication cost of
the user is partially outsourced to the servers, similarly as
is done for the computation. This is enabled by allowing
the servers to cooperate in addition to colluding. This is
particularly attractive in applications where the server–
user and server–server communication costs differ. This
could be the case when the helper servers are clustered
within close proximity.
• We present several examples of how communication cost
can be outsourced to helper nodes. We present these
examples in the language of secret sharing, since the data
retrieval phase in SDMM and PIR can be seen as data
collection and recovery in a secret sharing scheme [27].
• We study an SDMM scheme that lends itself particularly
well to the use of cooperation among servers. We show
that this cooperative scheme outperforms several other
non-cooperative schemes for a wide range of parameters.
The idea of utilizing cooperation between colluding servers
to reduce communication cost can be applied to other schemes
as well. However, it is highly non-trivial how to organize the
servers and their communication to optimize this cooperation.
C. Organization
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we in-
troduce some preliminaries, including the so-called collusion
and cooperation graph for the abstraction of the problem,
the computation problem setting, and Reed-Solomon codes.
In Section III, we introduce secret sharing, cooperative data
retrieval, and present examples of how cooperation between
servers can significantly reduce the download cost for the
user. In section IV, a motivating example of the SDMM code
under the server cooperation model and the general scheme are
presented, followed by an extensive comparison with existing
schemes. Finally, Section V draws the conclusions.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM SETTING
In this section, we introduce some necessary preliminaries.
First of all, let us fix some notation. Let Fq denote a finite
field containing q elements, where q is a prime power. For
two integers a and b with a ≤ b, denote by [a, b) and [a, b] the
set {a, a+ 1, . . . , b− 1} and {a, a+ 1, . . . , b}, respectively.
A. Collusion and Cooperation
Let V be the set of helper servers. Then we define the
collusion graph (V,E) on the vertex set V by adding an edge
(vi, vj) to E whenever servers vi and vj collude/cooperate.
We only consider the symmetric case here where both servers
gain access to each other’s data, but similar results can be
formulated for the directed case.
Definition 1. We say we have X-collusion if the biggest
component of (V,E) is of size X .
A scheme is secure against X-collusion if no information
is leaked to the servers even if there is X-collusion.
We will from here on assume that all servers that can collude
also cooperate. For simplicity, we assume that all but one
components of the collusion/cooperation graph are of size X ,
the final component containing |V | mod X servers.
B. Problem Setting
In this subsection, we restrict the problem setting to SDMM
under the server cooperation model as the motivation, while
the settings for the other problems with cooperation such as
the recovery of a shared secret and PIR are similar.
In SDMM under server cooperation model, the user is
interested in computing the product of two matrices A ∈ Ft×sq
and B ∈ Fs×rq over some finite field Fq with the assistance
of N honest-but-curious servers. The contents of the matrices
A and B should remain secret in the information–theoretic
sense, i.e., the servers learn nothing about the content of the
matrices even if X of them collude, where 1 ≤ X < N .
The multiplication of the two matrices A and B can be
accomplished according to the following steps.
• Upload phase: The user encodes A and B with some
random matrices to obtain matrices Ãi and B̃i for i ∈
[0, N), and then sends Ãi and B̃i to server i. In addition,
the user sends the corresponding evaluation points P to
the servers, which are randomly chosen from Fq and will
be used to generate the shared data in the next step1.
• Computation and cooperative phase: First, server i com-
putes the product of Ãi and B̃i for all i ∈ [0, N). Second,
the fastest Rc servers seek to cooperate, among them
sets of size up to X servers can form a cooperating
group for further processing. We assume a best case
scenario, where all but at most one component of the
collaboration/cooperation graph are of maximal size |X |.
Hence we have ⌈Rc
X
⌉ cooperation groups.
• Decoding phase: A representative server in each cooper-
ation group i sends a message to the user, denoted by Yi
for i ∈ R ⊂ [0, N), where |R| = ⌈Rc
X
⌉. The user then
decodes AB from what they received.
The scheme must satisfy the following two constraints.
• X-security: Any X servers learn nothing about neither
A nor B, i.e.,
I({Ãi, B̃i}i∈X ;A,B) = 0
for any X ⊂ [0, N) with |X | = X , where I(Y ;Z)
denotes the mutual information between Y and Z .
• Correctness: The user must be able to recover AB from
Yi, i ∈ R, i.e.,
H(AB|Yi, i ∈ R) = 0,
where H(Y |Z) denotes the entropy of Y conditioned on
Z .
In addition, we wish to minimize the recovery threshold Rc
as well as the communication cost, which is comprised of the
1As the evaluation points are small compared to the matrices, the cost of
uploading them can be neglected. It may also be possible to assume that this
information is a priori shared with the helper servers. For this reason and also
for the convenience of notation, the upload cost of the evaluation points P
will be neglected in the sequel.
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upload cost and the download cost. As usual in the SDMM







where |M | is the size of the matrix M counted as Fq symbols.




Remark 1. For PIR it is common to measure these quantities
using entropy instead of size, assuming a compression can
be applied before transfer. For the SDMM problem though
that we want to focus on, requiring the user to decompress
the received information can be equivalent or harder than the
computational task that was outsourced.
To facilitate the comparison with different schemes, we














C. Reed-Solomon (RS) Codes
The encoding phase of SDMM codes is usually based on
Reed-Solomon codes or their sub-codes. To this end, we
briefly introduce RS codes in the following.
Definition 2. ( [41]) Let x0, x1, . . . , xN−1 be pairwise distinct
elements in Fq. The [N,K] RS code associate to these N
locators is defined as
C = {(p(x0), p(x1), . . . , p(xN−1)) |p ∈ Fq[x], deg(p) < K}.
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The above generator matrix is the transpose of a Vander-
monde matrix over Fq, showing that RS codes belong to the
class of MDS codes.
III. COOPERATIVE DATA RETRIEVAL
A. Secret Sharing
Secret sharing has been introduced independently in [42]
and [43]. A good introduction to the general theory of secret
sharing can be found in [44]. We begin by describing a very
general setup that can be found in many applications.
Proposition 1 (Secure Coded Storage). Let C be a linear
[N,K] code with generator matrix G. Let G>ρ be the matrix
consisting of the lowest K − ρ rows of G. The matrix G>ρ
defines an [N,K − ρ] code and we denote the minimum
distance of its dual by X + 1. Then we can securely store
ρ symbols on a storage system consisting of N servers using
the code C such that any X servers learn nothing about the
ρ information symbols.
Proof. We begin by describing the storage and then prove its
secrecy. Let m = (m0, . . . ,mρ−1) be the vector containing
our information, and s = (s0, . . . , sK−ρ−1) be a random
vector in FK−ρq . We encode (m, s) into a length N vector
by calculating
(m0, . . . ,mρ−1, s0, . . . , sK−ρ−1)G = (y0, . . . , yN−1)
and store the symbol yi on server i.
Now consider any set of X servers that might collude with
index set T . Together they observe the partial vector y|T =
(yt)t∈T which is given by
y|T = m(G≤ρ)|T + s(G>ρ)|T .
Since the dual of G>ρ has minimum distance X+1, any set of
X columns of G>ρ is linearly independent. Hence the vector
s(G>ρ)|T is uniformly random in F
X
q and the servers can not
learn anything about the vector m.
Corollary 1. Let C be an [N,K] RS code. Then we can
securely store ρ < K symbols on a database consisting of N
servers using the code C, such that any X = N − ρ servers
learn nothing about the information symbols.
Many secret sharing schemes can be understood as secure
coded storage in the sense of Proposition 1. Furthermore, some
PIR schemes and SDMM schemes have as an intermediate step
a secure coded storage where the servers hold coded shares of
a secret message. The following considerations hence apply
to all of these schemes.
Definition 3 (Linear Secret Sharing). A secret sharing scheme
is considered to be linear if the secret m is a linear combina-
tion of any K shares.
Example 1 (Shamir Secret Sharing). We describe the Shamir
Secret Sharing scheme and explain how it fits our definition of
secure coded storage. Let x0, . . . , xN−1 be pairwise distinct
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is a generator matrix for an [N,K] RS code. Clearly, G>1
defines an [N,K−1] RS code and its dual hence has minimum
distance K . Given a secret m and a random vector u ∈ FK−1q
we calculate N shares (m,u)G = (y0, . . . , yN−1). This
defines an [N,K] threshold secret sharing scheme, where any
K − 1 servers can not learn anything about the secret m but
any K can successfully recover the secret.
Remark 2. The unusual way of defining the generator matrix
is not necessary. But this way the restriction that 0 can not be
used as an evaluation point xi is removed and the proof that
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the lower part of the matrix defines an MDS code becomes
trivial.
B. Cooperation
Theorem 1. Let y0, . . . , yK−1 be a recovery set of a linear
secret sharing scheme and αi ∈ Fq the coefficients of the
linear combination resulting in the secret m, i.e., m =
∑
αiyi.
Let V0, . . . , Vγ−1 be the collection of connected components
of the collusion graph, i.e.
⊔γ−1
c=0 Vc = V . Using cooperation
between connected servers, it suffices to download γ symbols
to recover the secret.
Proof. We describe a recovery scheme that only contacts
γ servers and hence achieves a download cost of γ. For
any connected component one vertex vc is selected. The
server vc collects the shares of all servers in its component
and calculates a response rc :=
∑
i:vi∈Vc




αiyi = s and hence a data collector recovers
the secret by adding the responses rc.
Remark 3. Note that for the scheme described in Theorem 1 it
is not necessary to know the collusion graph beforehand. The
servers are able to organize the calculation of the responses
independently.
Obviously, some applications store more than one symbol
using secure storage. In these cases, retrieval becomes more
challenging. Improvements in the download cost using coop-
erating groups are still possible, but more care is needed in
terms of which servers share their data. We describe a general
theorem and give two short examples for motivation. The proof
is straightforward and is presented here for completeness.
Theorem 2. Let G be the generator matrix of the storage
code. We partition the set of columns into subsets G|Vc and
the servers in the set Vc compute a linear combination rc =∑
i∈Vc
αiyi. Then a user can recover a secret mi from these





where G|Vc denotes the sub-matrix of G formed by the columns
indicated by Vc, g
i is the ith column of G, and ei is the i-th
column of the identify matrix with the same order as G.






i). We see that yi =
(m,u)gi where m is the vector of message symbols and u is
























and the data collector can compute the message symbol mi
from the responses.
Example 2. Let C be a [2K,K + 1] RS code with generator
matrix as in example 1 used to store two message symbols.
Assume we have four disjoint cooperation sets, |V0| = |V1| =
K − 1 and |V2| = |{x}| = 1 and |V3| = |{y}| = 1.
Since G>2|V0 and G>2|V1 are both full rank these sets
learn nothing about the message symbols. Furthermore, there
exist coefficients αi, βj and γ0, γ1, δ0, δ1 such that m0 =∑
i∈V0




where sl denotes the share possessed by server l. Therefore,







βjsj ,sx and sy to reconstruct two
message symbols. This gives us a download cost of 4 compared
to K + 1 without cooperation.
Example 3. We construct a secure coded storage based on the
[7, 3] simplex code. Assume we have three message symbols










1 1 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 1 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1










The matrix G>3 is the generator matrix of the simplex code,
hence its dual is the [7, 4, 3] Hamming code and the storage is
secure against 2-collusion. We consider the cooperation sets
V0 = {0}, V1 = {1, 2}, V2 = {3, 4}, V3 = {5, 6}. Each
cooperation set sends the sum of their shares. We can see that
the data collector can recover the three message symbols from
these 4 responses. The download cost here is then 4 compared
to 6 without cooperation.
C. Lagrange Interpolation
Another important class of examples can be described using
Lagrange interpolation.
Definition 4. [45] Given a set of K data points
(x0, y0), . . . , (xj , yj), . . . , (xK−1, yK−1)
where xj are pairwise distinct, the interpolation polynomial













where j ∈ [0,K).
Rewrite the polynomials L(x) in (4) and ℓ(j)(x) in (5) as

















θ + · · ·+yK−1ℓ
(K−1)
θ for θ ∈ [0,K). (8)
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Viewing the coefficient Lθ as a shared secret, we see that the
scheme defined in Def. 4 is a linear secret sharing scheme in
the sense of Def. 3. Thus we have the following result, which
can be seen as a realisation of Thm. 1.
Proposition 2. Assume there are N servers, and any X of
them can cooperate. Assume that yi is the evaluation of some
polynomial L(x) at xi for i ∈ [0, N), where deg(L(x)) =
K − 1 and K ∈ [1, N ]. If server i has the data x0, . . . , xN−1
and yi for i ∈ [0, N), then the user can obtain one of the




where θ ∈ [0,K).
Proof. Let K = ⌈K
X
⌉. W.l.o.g., assume that the first K
servers are the fastest ones and the user obtains the desired
coefficient from them. For i ∈ [0,K − 1), assume that servers
iX, iX+1, . . . , iX+X−1 seek to cooperate with each other,
while servers (K − 1)X, . . . ,K − 1 seek to cooperate, then
the coefficient Lθ can be retrieved through the following two
phases.
• Computation and cooperative phase: Each server j first
computes the polynomial ℓ(j)(x) in (5) and then com-
putes yjℓ
(j)
θ . For i ∈ [0,K − 1), server iX + j transmits
yiX+jℓ
(iX+j)




(K−1)X for j ∈ [1,K−(K−1)X). For i ∈ [0,K−1),














• Decoding phase: For i ∈ [0,K), server iX sends YiX to
the user, who then sums the data they received to obtain
Lθ according to (8).
Then the total download cost is ⌈K
X
⌉|Lθ|.
IV. SDMM UNDER SERVER COOPERATION MODEL
In this section, we study an SDMM code construction under
the server cooperation model. Let us assume that the user is
interested in computing AB, where A ∈ Ft×sq and B ∈ F
s×r
q
with the assistance of N servers, while any X servers can
collude to deduce the information of A and B. These colluding
servers can now also cooperate.
A. A Motivating Example of the SDMM Code under Server
Cooperation
Assume that the user is interested in computing AB for
A ∈ Ft×sq and B ∈ F
s×r
q with the assistance of N ≥ 7
servers, while any X = 2 servers can collude to deduce the
information of A and B, where t, s, r are even. The user










where Aj ∈ F
t× s
2




q for k = 0, 1.
Then
AB = A0B0 +A1B1.
Let Z0, Z1 be two random matrices over F
t× s
2
q and S0, S1




q . The user encodes the
matrices A and B by an [N, 4] RS code, i.e., first creating
two polynomials
f(x) = A0 +A1x+ Z0x
2 + Z1x
3,
g(x) = B0x+B1 + S0x
2 + S1x
3,
and then evaluating them at N distinct points in Fq, say
a0, . . . , aN−1. Then the user sends f(ai), g(ai) to server i
for i ∈ [0, N), i.e., the upload cost is N( ts2 +
sr
2 ).
Let h(x) = f(x)g(x), i.e.,
h(x)
= f(x)g(x)
= A0B1 + (A0B0 + A1B1)x+ (A1B0 + A0S0 + Z0B1)x
2
+(A0S1 + A1S0 + Z0B0 + Z1B1)x
3
+(A1S1 + Z1B0 + Z0S0)x




Now deg(h(x)) = 6 and A0B0 + A1B1 is exactly the
coefficient of the monomial x in h(x), therefore, the recovery
threshold is Rc = 7.
The coefficient A0B0+A1B1 of the term x in h(x) can be
retrieved through the following steps.
• Computation and cooperative phase: First, server j com-
putes the product of f(aj) and g(aj) to obtain h(aj)
for all j ∈ [0, N). Assume that servers j0, j1, . . . , j6
are the fastest 7 servers, and further assume that servers
j2i and j2i+1 seek to cooperate with each other for







to obtain the coefficient ℓ
(ji)
1 of the term x in ℓ
(ji)(x),
and then multiply it with h(aji). Finally, server 2ji + 1
transmits ℓ
(2ji+1)
1 h(a2ji+1) to server 2ji for i ∈ [0, ⌊
7
2⌋),
who then further computes
Y2ji = ℓ
(2ji)
1 h(a2ji) + ℓ
(2ji+1)
1 h(a2ji+1).
• Decoding phase: Server 2ji sends Y2ji to the user for
i ∈ [0, 4), where Y6 = ℓ
(j6)
1 h(aj6). The user sums up the








answer from server 0
+ ℓ
(j2)




answer from server 2
+ ℓ
(j4)









answer from server 6
according to (8).
Thus, the download cost is 4tr.
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TABLE I
A COMPARISON OF THE KEY PARAMETERS BETWEEN THE PROPOSED COOPERATIVE SDMM CODE AND SOME EXISTING ONES.
Upload cost Download cost Rc (Recovery Threshold) References















(m +X)(n + 1) − 1 [5]







≥ mn+max{m,n}+ 2X − 1 [7]










⌉+ 2X − 1, p < m,
pmn+ pm+ (mn−m)⌈ X
min{m,n}
⌉+ 2X − 1, p ≥ m.
[10]







2R(p,m, n) + 2X − 1 [30]






⌉ 2p + 2X − 1 Theorem 3
B. A Cooperative SDMM Scheme
In general, we have the following result for the new coop-
erative SDMM code.
Theorem 3. Assume any X servers can collude and co-
operate. Then, there exists an explicit cooperative SDMM
scheme by which the product of A and B can be securely





), download cost tr⌈Rc
X
⌉, and recovery threshold
Rc = 2p+ 2X − 1.
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t× s
p





AB = A0B0 +A1B1 + · · ·+Ap−1Bp−1. (9)
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where αj = j, βj = p− 1− j for j ∈ [0, p), γt = δt = p+ t
for t ∈ [0, X), and then evaluates them at N distinct points
a0, . . . , aN−1 in Fq. Then, the user sends f(ai), g(ai) to server












































































the coefficient of the monomial xp−1 in h(x). Therefore,
computing AB is equivalent to retrieving the coefficient of
the monomial xp−1 in h(x). For i ∈ [0, N), server i computes
h(ai) = f(ai)g(ai). Then, applying Proposition 2, we can get
the desired result. The proof for being X-secure is guaranteed
by Corollary 1. An alternative proof can be found in [46,
Section 4.2].
C. Comparison
In this subsection, we make comparisons of some key
parameters between the proposed cooperative SDMM scheme
and some existing ones without cooperation, where Table I
gives the first comparison.
As some previous SDMM schemes in Table I employ
different matrix partitioning as ours, to give a fair comparison,
we consider the case that the matrices are partitioned into the
same number of small blocks and compare the normalized
parameters in Table II to ease the comparison. Especially, in
Table II, we consider the case that the matrices A and B are
partitioned either vertically or horizontally into p blocks, and
assume that both the matrices A and B are square matrices
of order p for convenience. While Figure 1 visualizes the
comparison for p = 5 and p = 10.
Based on the above extensive comparison, we can see that




A COMPARISON OF THE KEY (NORMALIZED) PARAMETERS FOR THE SPECIAL CASE THAT THE MATRICES A AND B ARE PARTITIONED EITHER
VERTICALLY OR HORIZONTALLY INTO p BLOCKS AND t = s = r.
Normalized Upload cost Normalized Download cost Rc (Recovery Threshold) Refs.
Chang-Tandon’s code N/p (p +X)2/p2 (p+X)2 [2]
Kakar et al.’s code 1 N/p ((p +X)(p + 1)− 1)/p2 p2 + pX + p +X − 1 [5]
GASP code N/p (p2 + p + 2X − 1)/p2 ≥ p2 + p + 2X − 1 [7]
SGPD code N/p 2p + 2X − 1 2p + 2X − 1 [10]
Secure Entangled Polynomial code N/p 2p + 2X − 1 2p + 2X − 1 [30]
The cooperative SDMM code N/p ⌈ 2p+2X−1
X
⌉ 2p + 2X − 1 Thm. 3
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Fig. 1. Comparison of the normalized download cost and the number of colluding servers between the cooperative SDMM code and some other schemes
without server cooperation, where p = 5 (left) and p = 10 (right), respectively. The normalization of the download cost is over |AB|.
• From Table I, it is seen that when m = n = 1, the SDMM
code under the server cooperation model requires much
smaller download cost than that of the SGPD code in
[10] and the secure Entangled Polynomial code in [9]
(R(p, 1, 1) = p by Lemma 7.1 in [33]), while the upload
cost and the recovery thresholds are the same.
• From Figure 1, we see that the SDMM code under the
server cooperation model always has a significant gain
in the download cost when compared with the ones that
employing exactly the same matrix partitioning method
(i.e., the SGPD code [10] and the secure Entangled
Polynomial code [9]) as ours.
• From Figure 1, it is seen that when compared with the
other SDMM schemes that employ totally different matrix
partitioning, the SDMM code under server cooperation
model has a smaller normalized download cost for some
region. While for the region that our scheme has a larger
normalized download cost than some other schemes, the
advantage is that the cooperative SDMM scheme has a
significantly smaller recovery threshold, which can be
easily seen from Table II for the special case.
• From Figure 1, we see that if X is smaller than a
threshold, the cooperative SDMM scheme does not have
much gain in the download cost or even worse when
compared with some other schemes without cooperation,
this is because totally different matrix partitions are
employed, which lead to different trade-offs. In this case,
the recovery threshold of the cooperative SDMM scheme
is significantly smaller. For example, when p = 5 and
X = 20, from Table II, we see the recovery thresholds
of Chang–Tandon’s code [2], Kakar et al.’s code 1 [5],
and the GASP code [7] are 625, 149, and no smaller
than 69, respectively, while the recovery threshold of
the cooperative SDMM code is 49. Furthermore, when
p = 10 and X = 20, the recovery thresholds of
Chang–Tandon’s code [2], Kakar et al.’s code 1 [5], and
the GASP code [7] are 900, 329, and no smaller than
149, respectively, while the recovery threshold of the
cooperative SDMM code is 59.
Note that we can also enable the cooperation in other
previous SDMM schemes according to Proposition 2, such as
the ones mentioned in Table I. However, as the other SDMM
schemes use totally different matrix partitioning, then the user
needs to retrieve mn coefficients of a specific polynomial, see
(1) as an example. Then, Proposition 2 should be applied mn
times to obtain all the mn coefficients. A straightforward cal-
culation easily shows that the download cost of all the schemes
in Table I is tr⌈Rc
X
⌉ if cooperation is enabled, but the recovery
threshold Rc is different for different schemes. Compared with
Table I, we see that the other SDMM schemes can get a gain
in the download cost when X ≥ mn (or X ≥ m2 for Chang–
Tandon’s code) if enabling the cooperation strategy in this
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work. Thus, the cooperation strategy in this work may not
always be efficient for the other schemes that use different
matrix partitioning, especially if X < mn.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we considered a new cooperative SDMM
model, which utilizes a possible link between the helper
servers to reduce the download cost for the user. More pre-
cisely, this is enabled by outsourcing server-to-user communi-
cation to the servers. The communication ability of the servers
comes together with the collusion assumption, previously con-
sidered a hindrance. Outsourcing communication in addition to
computation may also help in preventing network congestion.
In some cases, e.g., when servers are clustered within close
proximity, inter-server communication can be considered to be
cheaper than server-user communication. Based on this model,
a new SDMM code construction was proposed. A comparison
of the key parameters between the proposed SDMM code and
some previous ones was given, showing a significant gain in
the download cost.
While server cooperation can be seen as a general strat-
egy, explicit per-scheme description is nontrivial as there are
several parameters to consider. Construction of schemes that
allow for a more general matrix partitioning is part of our
ongoing work.
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